【Micro/Macro seminar】“Whatever it takes”: a good communication strategy?
2024/04/23
研討會日期 : 2024-04-23
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Dr. Federico Innocenti
地點 : Conference Room B110
主持人 : Professor Tsung-Hsien Li
演講者簡介 : Dr. Federico Innocenti received his PhD from the University of Mannheim in 2022. He is currently a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of Verona. In his research, he uses theory and experiments to study information: its design, demand, and welfare effects. He occasionally investigates different topics, such as digital platforms, bundling, and health issues.
演講摘要 : Central banks strategically provide information to economic agents to influence their behavior. Interests are often aligned, but economic agents are inattentive to too complex information. What is, then, the best disclosure policy for a central bank? We study a Bayesian persuasion model to answer this question. We find that the answer depends on the objective of the central bank. When the goal is to reduce uncertainty, the central bank balances its informative purpose with the need to receive attention. When the goal is to reduce volatility, the central bank provides some information only if it has private information.
