演講者簡介 : Ms. Megumi Murakami is expected to receive her PhD from Northwestern University in 2024. Her research interests are Economic History, Game Theory, and Microeconomic Theory. She is applying for a position of the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica now.
演講摘要 : This paper studies two millennia of medical history and its stagnant development compared to other natural sciences, using a signaling game. Upon observing signals, two physicians (or the senders) choose either old or new technologies. Then, a unit mass of patients (or the receivers) select one of the two physicians. Depending on parameters, there are three types of pure strategy equilibria, corresponding to the three stages in the evolution of medical technology. Our results identify three contributing factors to the stagnant development of medicine: bias in patients’ beliefs toward the old method, the limited accuracy of physicians’ signals, and intense competition. In particular, intense competition is detrimental to the dissemination of medical knowledge because the physicians tend to stick to the old technology to attract biased patients.
