【Micro Seminar】Joint Design of Team Production Technology and Performance Pay

  • 研討會日期 : 2023-11-21
  • 時間 : 10:30
  • 主講人 : Professor Lester Chan
  • 地點 : Conference Room B110
  • 演講者簡介 : Professor Lester Chan received his PhD from Boston University in 2021. He is currently an Assistant Professor at Xiamen University. His research interests are microeconomic theory and industrial organization, focusing on contract theory, business economics, platforms, and potential games.
  • 演講摘要 : A principal incentivizes a team of agents to exert efforts on a project by offering them bonuses upon project success. In addition to bonuses she also designs the project's technology, which maps agents' effort profiles to project success probabilities. Multiple equilibria typically arise due to agents' strategic interactions. Unlike the case where the principal only sets bonuses, I show that it is possible to derive a joint bonus-technology design that is optimal for her for a large class of equilibrium selection criteria/implementation requirements. An implication is that this joint design achieves a good balance between optimality and robustness for her. The corresponding technology exhibits strategic independence among agents' efforts, eliminating their coordination concerns. In addition, I show that any technology exhibiting strategic substitutability among efforts is suboptimal for the principal for all standard implementation requirements.