【Micro Seminar】Distributionally Robust Auction Design

  • 研討會日期 : 2022-12-08
  • 時間 : 14:30
  • 主講人 : Professor Yi-Chun Chen (陳逸羣)
  • 地點 : Conference room B110
  • 主持人 : Professor Chih-Chun Yang
  • 演講者簡介 : Professor Yi-Chun Chen received his Ph.D. in Economics from Northwestern University in 2009. He is currently a Professor at the National University of Singapore. His research interests are Game Theory and Mechanism Design.
  • 演講摘要 : A single unit of a good is sold to one of a group risk-neutral bidders whose privately known values are drawn independently from an identical distribution. The seller only has limited information about the value distribution and believes that the value distribution is designed by Nature adversarially to minimize revenue. In addition, the seller knows that bidders play undominated strategies. For the two-bidder case, we construct a strong maxmin solution, consisting of a mechanism, a value distribution, and an equilibrium in undominated strategies, such that neither the seller nor Nature can move revenue in their respective preferred directions, even if the deviator can select the new equilibrium in undominated strategies. The mechanism and value distribution solve a family of maxmin mechanism design and minmax information design problems, regardless of how an equilibrium in undominated strategies is selected. The maxmin mechanism is a second-price auction with a random reserve price. For arbitrary number of bidders, a second-price auction with a random reserve price remains a maxmin mechanism among a subclass of dominant-strategy mechanisms.