演講者簡介 : Professor Payne received his Ph.D. in Economics from New York University in 2019. He is currently an assistant Professor at Princeton University. His research interests are Money and Banking, Macroeconomics, Financial Economic History and Computational Economics.
演講摘要 : Digital money requires a ledger. By integrating this ledger with its other ledgers, a platform can enforce repayment of uncollateralized credit, beyond the ability of the banking sector.
However, by controlling interoperability to other platforms’ ledgers, an incumbent platform can
“lock-in” customers and increase its market power. Open banking, which gives users control of
interoperability, limits uncollateralized credit. Introducing CBDC as digital legal tender (on an
isolated ledger) hurts credit extension, but enhances it when combined with an open architecture public ledger as a “smart CBDC”
