【Job talk】Informational Regulation of Public Good Monopolists

  • 研討會日期 : 2021-12-29
  • 時間 : 10:00
  • 主講人 : Mr. Junrok Park
  • 地點 : Online or Conference Room B110
  • 主持人 : Professor Chih-Chun Yang
  • 演講者 : Mr. Junrok Park
  • 演講者簡介 : Mr. Park will receive his Ph.D. in Economics from University of California, Los Angeles in 2022. His research interests are Economic Theory, Mechanism Design, Information Design and Provision of Public Goods. He is applying for a position of the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica now.
  • 演講摘要 : A monopolist sells a public good to a group of agents who privately observe a signal about their valuation. The public good is sold through an optimal mechanism subject to the ex-post incentive constraints. This paper characterizes the regulator’s solution, an information structure that maximizes the agents’ expected payoffs. It limits the impact of free-riding while imposing indifference on the monopolist so that the public good is always sold with any number of agents. Moreover, the monopolist’s market power is quickly dissipated as the number of agents increases. This paper also constructs the maximin public good sales mechanism, which maximizes the worst-case expected profit of the monopolist, subject to a limited knowledge of the true information structure. It qualitatively depends on the number of agents. With two agents, it is a scoring mechanism.