演講者簡介 : Professor Xue received her Ph.D. in Economics from Rice University in 2013. She is currently an Assistant Professor at Singapore Management University. Her research interests are Microeconomic theory, fair division, decision theory, mechanism design.
演講摘要 : We define a local notion of dominance that speaks to the true choice problems among actions in a game tree. When we do not restrict players’ ability to do contingent reasoning, a reduced strategy is weakly dominant if and only if it prescribes a locally dominant action at every decision node, therefore any dynamic decomposition of a direct mechanism that preserves strategy-proofness is robust to the lack of global planning. Under a form of wishful thinking, we also show that strategy-proofness is robust to the lack of forward planning. More-over, we identify simple forms of contingent reasoning and foresight, driven by the local viewpoint. We construct a dynamic game that implements the Top Trading Cycles allocation in locally dominant actions under these simple forms of reasoning.
