Managing Multiple Commons: Strategy-Proofness And Min-Price Walras

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• 研討會日期 : 2015-06-10
• 時間 : 14:30
• 主講人 : Mr. Ryan Tierney
• 主持人 : Professor Chun-Hsien Yeh
• 地點 : Conference Room B110
• 演講者簡介 : Mr. Tierney is currently a PhD candidate in Economics at the University of Rochester and will received his Ph.D. in Economics at 2015. He is currently a specially appointed researcher at Institute of Social and Economic Research of Osaka University. His research fields are Institutions, market design, resource allocation, networks, and political economy.
• 演講摘要 : There are several locations, each of which is endowed with a resource that is specific to that location. Examples include coastal fisheries, oil fields, etc. Each agent will go to a single location and harvest some of the resource there. Several agents may go to each location. Selling the commons for money may not be desirable, either because agents have equal right to use the resources or because control of the commons would give unacceptable market power to its owner. Thus we will assign harvesting rights based on preferences alone, though the model can be extended to accommodate private endowments of money. We find the best allocation rule in the class of rules that are strategy-proof, anonymous, and that satisfy a weak continuity property. We also find an ascending mechanism, similar to an auction, that implements the rule. The rule is defined via a simulated price equilibrium, wherein agents buy their desired resource with tokens distributed by the social planner. Equilibria of this form are not unique as full distribution of the resources is not required. However, we find that equilibrium price vectors form a lower semi-lattice and thus there is a unique minimal price vector. While many models find such a property, our finding is not a corollary of previous work and thus is a technical contribution to the literature on economies with divisible and indivisible goods. The equilibria associated with the minimal price vector are called min-price Walrasian equilibria. These equilibria form an essentially single-valued correspondence, and this correspondence is the rule we characterize.