Shall We Trade: Dynamic Non-Rivalry and Limits to Private Ownership

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• 研討會日期 : 2014-03-18
• 時間 : 14:00
• 主講人 : Professor Jiahua Che
• 地點 : Conference Room B110
• 演講者簡介 : Professor Che received his Ph.D. in Economics from Stanford University in 1996. He is currently an Associate Professor at Department of Economics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. His research fields are Comparative Institutional Analysis, China's Economy and Political Economy, Theory of the Firm and Development Economics. He is applying for the position of the Institute of Economics, AS right now.
• 演講摘要 : Land or space in general, art, identification or title, knowledge, items in digital formats are goods that share the property that they are able to retain their physical properties and hence to offer undiminished utility to people despite previous consumption by others. We refer to this property as dynamic non-rivalry. These goods are not public goods as they can be excludable as well as (arguably) rivalrous. To highlight the property that such a good can be used by others despite one’s previous consumption, we refer to goods with dynamic non-rivalry as heritage good instead of perfectly durable goods. We envision an economy of overlapping generations where humans consume both the heritage good and a regular consumption good that must be produced through human efforts and perishes upon consumption. We analyze the efficiency implication of private ownership of heritage good, beginning with the case where the heritage good is in fixed supply and later extending to the case where the supply of the heritage good can be augmented with human efforts. We show that unrestricted private ownership of heritage good leads to overproduction of the regular consumption good, excessive savings, and lower well-being in equilibrium, whereas restricted private ownership that limits perpetual trading of the heritage good across generations help restore efficiency. We relate the restricted private ownership of heritage goods to the limited tenure of intellectual property rights. Our analysis suggests a possible reason behind China’s high growth and high saving after urban housing reform. Comparative statics as well as policy implications are derived.