Axiomatic and Strategic Justifications for the Constrained Equal Benefits Rule in the Airport Problem
2011/05/03
研討會日期 : 2011-05-03
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Chun-Hsieh Yeh
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Chun-Hsieh Yeh got his Ph.D. in Economics from University of Rochester in 2002. He is currently serving as Associate Research Fellow at Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica. His research field is in game theory, mechanism design, and political economy.
演講摘要 : We consider the “airport problem”, which is concerned with sharing the cost of an airstrip among agents who need airstrips of different lengths. We investigate the implications of two properties, Left-endpoint Subtraction (LS) bilateral consistency and LS converse consistency, in the airport problem. First, on the basis of the two properties, we characterize the constrained equal benefits rule, which equalizes agents' benefits subject to no one receiving a subsidy. Second, we introduce a 3-stage extensive form game that exploits LS bilateral consistency and LS converse consistency. We show that there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game and moreover, it is the allocation chosen by the constrained equal benefits rule.
