Intergenerational Risk Sharing with Limited Commitment
2010/12/07
研討會日期 : 2010-12-07
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Koichi Miyazaki
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Koichi Miyazaki got his Ph.D. in Economics from The Pennsylvania State University in 2010. He is currently serving as Assistant Professor of Department of Economics at National Taiwan University. His research field is in macroeconomics, public economics, political economy and game theory.
演講摘要 : The paper considers a pure exchange stochastic overlapping generations model in which, at each date, an economy faces an endowment shock. To be precise, in one shock a young agent is relatively richer than an old agent, and in the other shock an old agent is relatively richer than a young agent. At each date, a young agent and an old agent simultaneously decide how much of their respective endowments to transfer to the other agent; however, a young agent cannot make promises about how much she will give when she gets old. In this sense, an economy faces a limited commitment constraint. I study an efficient and subgame perfect risk sharing allocation, and discuss differences from an infinitely-lived-agents model such as Kocherlakota (1996).
