Are Firm- and Country-Specific Governance Substitutes? Evidence from Financial Contracts in Emerging
2009/03/24
研討會日期 : 2009-03-24
時間 : 15:30
主講人 : Professor Iftekhar Hasan
地點 : B110
演講者簡介 : Professor Iftekhar Hasan為Ph.D. in University of Houston (1987)。目前為Cary L. Wellington Professor of Finance and the Director of the International Center for Financial Research at the Lally School of Management and Technology of the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute。其主要研究領域為Corporate Finance、Financial Institutions、Entrepreneurial Finance and Capital Markets。
演講摘要 : We examine how borrowers’ corporate governance influence bank loan syndicate structure and contracting terms after controlling for country-level governance. Using data on firm-level corporate governance rankings across 14 emerging markets, evidence confirms that lenders create smaller and more concentrated loan syndications to facilitate monitoring and low cost re-contracting in the event of default in response to borrower’s lower corporate governance. Borrowers with better corporate governance obtain more favorable bank loan contracting terms, such as larger amount, longer maturity, lower interest rate spread, and less collateral requirements. Evidence also reveals that firm-level corporate governance provisions matter more to determine bank loan contracting process in counties with weaker country-level corporate governance such as legal systems. This suggests that firm-specific corporate governance and legal environment are substitutes in writing and enforcing financial contracts. Our findings are robust, irrespective of types of regression methods and specifications.
