On Majoritarian Bargaining with Incomplete Information
2008/08/05
研討會日期 : 2008-08-05
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : 蔡崇聖
地點 : B棟110室
演講者簡介 : Professor Tsung-Sheng Tsai 為Ph.D. in Economics，University of Wisconsin-Madison (2002)。
目前為清華大學經濟系助理教授。
其主要研究領域為公共經濟學、個體經濟學及政治經濟學。
演講摘要 : This paper extends Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989) majoritarian bargaining game to a world with incomplete information and, in particular, it completely characterizes the pure-strategy equilibrium of the game for the three-player version. Our main findings include: (i) there exists a unique equilibrium proposal in the first session for each and every combination of players’ types; (ii) the equilibrium proposal varies from minimum-winning to oversized coalitions as the difference between players’ types becomes large; (iii) delay occurs with a positive probability whenever oversized coalitions are formed, and the logic underlying this result runs contrary to Riker’s (1962) celebrated argument for oversized coalitions; (iv) there exist scenarios that support either a minimum-winning or a grand coalition, and the resulting grand coalition is the unique equilibrium of an extensive form game and is immune to the ex post incentive problem inherent in Weingast’s (1979) explanation for universalism norm; and (v) equilibrium proposals do not converge for some but not all combinations of players’ types, and some equilibrium proposals that do not converge alternate between pooling and separating.
