Strategic Pricing Behavior under Asset Value Maximization
2006/07/04
研討會日期 : 2006-07-04
時間 : 15:00
主講人 : Prof. C. C. Yang
地點 : C棟103會議室
演講者簡介 : Prof. C. C. Yang 為Ph.D. in Economics，Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (1989)。
現為本所特聘研究員。
其主要研究領域為Public Economics及Political Economics。
演講摘要 : This paper extends the seminal work of Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde (1986) to address the question: how should we fund the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)? We first characterize the equilibria resulting from the interaction between taxpayers and the budget-constrained IRS, and then study the efficiency implications of varying the size of the budget allocated to the IRS. It is shown that the budget size should be expanded as long as an additional dollar allocated to the IRS could return more than an additional dollar of tax revenue. This contrasts to Slemrod and Yitzhakifis (1987) policy prescription that the budget size should fall short of equating the marginal tax revenue to the marginal cost of collection..
