Minimum Winning versus Oversized Coalitions in Public Finance: The Role of Uncertainty
2006/10/24
研討會日期 : 2006-10-24
時間 : 15:00
主講人 : Prof. Tsung-Sheng Tsai
地點 : B棟110會議室
演講者簡介 : Prof. Tsung-Sheng Tsaii 為Ph.D. in Economics，University of Wisconsin-Madison（2002）。
現為本所助研究員。
其主要研究領域為Public Economics、Microeconomics及Political Economy。
演講摘要 : This paper extends Persson, Roland and Tabellini's (2000) simple legislature in the context of public finance to a world with uncertainty. In our extended model, (i) both minimum winning coalitions (MWCs) and oversized coalitions (OSCs) may arise in equilibrium, and (ii) the agenda setter's proposed policy may fail to receive a majority support. These two results are more consistent with empirical evidence than the standard case where an equilibrium always entails a MWC and the agenda setter's proposed policy never fails to pass. Contrary to Riker's (1962) celebrated suggestion that the creation of OSCs is meant to avoid uncertainty, we show that it occurs because players choose to face uncertainty in a sense. We also show that, instead of underbidding each other to the lowest reservation utility when the MWC applies, the creation of OSCs may induce voters to set the highest reservation utility to discipline their legislators.
