Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences
2006/06/03
研討會日期 : 2006-06-03
時間 : 14:00
主講人 : 溫泉教授
地點 : C棟103室
演講者簡介 : 溫泉教授為Ph.D. in Economics，University of Western Ontario（1991）。
現為Professor, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University。
其主要研究領域為Game Theory及Microeconomic Theory。
演講摘要 : There has been a long debate on equilibrium characterization in the negotiation model when players have different time preferences. We show that players behave quite differently under different time preferences than under common time preferences. Conventional analysis in this literature relies on the key assumption that all continuation payoffs are bounded from above by the bargaining frontier. However, when players have different time preferences, intertemporal trade may lead to continuation payoffs above the bargaining frontier. We provide a thorough study of this problem without imposing the conventional assumption. Our results tie up all the previous findings, and also clarify the controversies that arose in the past.
