Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Holdup Problem
2005/03/15
研討會日期 : 2005-03-15
時間 : 16:00
主講人 : Prof. Hideshi Itoh
地點 : B棟110室
演講者簡介 : Professor Hideshi Itoh（伊藤秀史）為 Ph.D., Stanford University, GSB。
其主要研究領域為Contract Theory。
目前任教於一橋大學商學院。並曾擔任 Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 及 International Economic Review 之 Editor 或 Associate editor
演講摘要 : We study the holdup problem in repeated transaction between a seller and a buyer such that the seller makes relation-specific investments in each period. We show that in situations where formal contracts have no value under spot transaction due to the cooperative nature of investment, writing a simple fixed-price contract can be valuable under repeated transaction: There is a range of parameter values in which a higher investment can be implemented only if a formal price contract is written and combined with a relational contract. We also show that there are cases in which not writing a formal contract but entirely relying on a relational contract increases the total surplus of the buyer and the seller. The key condition is how the investment affects the renegotiation price in general, and the alternative-use value in particular.
