演講者簡介 : Prof. Chen, Kong-Ping 為Ph.D.，University of Rochester (1993)。
其主要研究領域為Theory of Elections、Law and Economics及Personnel Economics。
現為本院人文社會科學研究中心研究員及本所合聘研究員。
演講摘要 : This paper investigates the optimal compensation scheme for workers in a team who value not only absolute but also relative incomes. A worker is said to be more ambitious if his utility places more weight on relative income. In this case, the firm can exploit the worker's preference for relative comparison to design a compensation scheme which induces the same effort level with lower cost. Under the optimal compensation scheme, the workers' wages are shown to depend on relative performance, and exhibit wage compression. More importantly, even if the production technology calls for absolute performance evaluation in the traditional principal-agent model, the optimal wage structure still relies on relative performance when workers are ambitious. Finally, in contrast to past literature, worker-heterogeneity is shown to reduce the firm's profit.
