演講者簡介 : Prof. Chung, Ching-Fan為Ph.D in Economics，University of Wisconsin-Madison (1987)。
現為本所研究員兼副所長。
其主要領域為Econometrics、Financial Economics及applied Microeconomics。
演講摘要 : Using a unique data set of automobile comprehensive insurance in Taiwan, this paper examines whether information asymmetry exists in the insurance market based on Chiappori and Salanie(2000) approach. With data on the timing of claims, we are able to estimate time-varying correlations between the choice of insurance coverage and the occurrence of the claims, which are significantly positive and exhibit a smirk pattern across policy months. In other words, information asymmetry does exist and may be contributed by both adverse selection and, more importantly, moral hazard. However, those correlations seem closely related to the claim amounts and can become insignificant when claims are defined for sufficiently large amounts. This finding suggests that insurance companies employ more stringent underwriting criteria for risky drivers, who may potentially create claims with greater amounts, and apply more stringent audit criteria for claims with greater amounts. In other words, insurance companies do have certain control over the asymmetric information problem of more costly nature.
