Public Good Provision versus Pure Redistribution: An Experimental Study of Majoritarian Ultimatum Games
2004/11/02
研討會日期 : 2004-11-02
時間 : 15:00
主講人 : Prof. Yang, Cheng-Chen
地點 : B棟110室
演講者簡介 : Prof. Yang, Cheng-Chen為Ph.D. in Economics，Virginia Tech (1989)。
現為本所特聘研究員。
其主要領域為Public Economics及Political Economics。
演講摘要 : There is a large experimental literature on ultimatum games, but surprisingly relatively little work has been done on majoritarian ultimatum games (MUG). This paper attempts to fill in the void. We seek “Speaking to Theorists” by testing whether the major aspects of the theoretical prediction of a MUG are consistent with the experimental data we gather. We are particularly interested in the comparison between a public good provision MUG (in which there exist solutions beneficial to all members of the society) and a pure redistribution MUG (in which no mutually beneficial opportunities are available to all members of the society). The qualitative properties of the subgame perfect equilibrium for these two games are predicted to be identical in theory. However, we find this theoretical prediction fails in some systematic way according to our data. We report several interesting findings in the context of related literature.
