演講者簡介 : Prof. Paul Rothstein為Ph.D.，University of California，Berkeley (1988)。
現為Associate Professor，Washington University。
其主要研究領域為Positive Modeling of Public Finance in the Multi-tiered Public Sector及Fiscal Competition in the Local Public Sector。
演講摘要 : We establish the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium for a class of games we call shared resource games and show that certain games of fiscal competition are shared resource games. In the few studies on the existence of equilibrium in models of fiscal competition, the authors assume unit taxes and allow the aggregate amount of the mobile factor to fall if the net return would otherwise be negative. We adopt an alternative framework and assume ad valorem taxes and a fixed aggregate amount of mobile factor. This makes it easier to show that payoff functions are quasiconcave in own strategies, but it creates discontinuities in payoff functions and the nonexistence of best replies in some cases. We solve a general version of this problem using a recent existence result by Reny (1999). This leads directly to new existence results for games of fiscal competition, including cases in which the strategy spaces are more than one dimensional or there are more than two players.
