The Shapley Value of a Dynamic Cooperative Game of Greenhouse Gases Reductions— Revisiting the Egali
2004/07/30
研討會日期 : 2004-07-30
時間 : 14:00
主講人 : Prof. Zili Yang
地點 : B棟110室
演講者簡介 : Prof. Zili Yang為Ph.D. in Economics，Yale University。
現為Assistant Professor，The State University of New York at Binghamton。
其主要研究領域為Economics of Climate Change and Other Global or Environmental Issue及Methodological Aspects of Economic Modeling。
演講摘要 : The Shapley value is an important solution concept in cooperative games. Its potential applications in policy evaluations of international cooperation on global environmental problems are yet fully appreciated. In this paper, we construct a dynamic cooperative game of stock externality provisions and specify the Shapley value of the game. The outcome of this game is the solution of a social planner’s optimal control problem under a particular set of social welfare weights. We then apply this game theoretic solution concept in the RICE model (Nordhaus and Yang, 1996), an influential model in climate change studies. We solve the Shapley value numerically through a sophisticated algorithm. By comparing and contrasting the Shapley value allocation with the Benthamite (utilitarian), Negishi, Lindahl allocations, and the open-loop Nash equilibrium, we show that the Shapley value possesses many desirable qualities for a successful international environmental agreement (IEA). Because of these good properties, the Shapley value should serve as a major benchmark for assessing strategic interactions among the regions on climate change policies.
