A Unified Approach to Information, Knowledge, and Stability

  • 研討會日期 : 2003-08-19
  • 時間 : 15:00
  • 主講人 : 羅 曉 教 授
  • 地點 : B棟110室
  • 演講者簡介 : 羅曉教授為Ph.D. in Economics,McGill University (2000)。 現為本所助研究員。 其主要研究領域為Game Theory、Economic Theory及Information Economics。
  • 演講摘要 : Within the context of strategic interaction, we provide a unified framework for analyzing information, knowledge, and the "stable" pattern of behavior. The major innovations are: (i) unlike the standard ad hoc semantic model of knowledge, the state space is constructed by Harsanyi's types that were explicitly formulated by Epstein and Wang (Econometrica 64, 1996, 1343-1373); (ii) players may be boundedly rational and have non-partitional information structures; and (iii) players may have general preferences, including subjective expected utility and non-expected utility. We first study the interactive epistemology. We then establish an equivalence theorem between a strictly dominated strategy and a never-best reply in terms of epistemic states. Finally, we explore epistemic foundations behind the fascinating idea of stability due to J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern。