演講者簡介 : 翁世芳教授為Ph.D. in Economics， Texas A&M University (1991)。
現為本所副研究員。
其主要研究領域為Game Theory and Application、Industrial Economics及Political Economics。
演講摘要 : Democratic societies institute independents to be the judicial factors. Their mission is to select the best alternative for the society in the midst of interest conflict. Nonetheless, to survive or pursue maximum payoff the independents may compromise their verdict with bribes or persecution. Endogenizing network and coalition formation, this paper investigates the conditions under which an independent will report truthfully or distort the facts. It first characterizes the equilibrium in a period. Assuming the
transcending value of the independent decreases with his past lies, this paper studies how the equilibrium changes with its decay. This paper then analyzes why the transcending value of the independent can be prevented from complete ruin over time.
