演講者簡介 : Mr. Cheng-Tai Wu為Ph.D. in Economics， University of Wisconsin-Madison (2003 expected)。
其主要研究領域為Microeconomic Theory。
演講摘要 : In an interdependent valuation, bilateral bargain environment when ownership of the
good is dispersed, we show that the optimal mechanism that maximizes the payoff of the uninformed agent is an at most two-step function; while the optimal mechanism that maximizes the payoff of the informed agent, which is also the second-best mechanism is an at most three-step function. By using the concept of Monotone Information Order (MIO) to rank over different precision of information structures, we then investigate how the values of optimal mechanisms change with respect to asymmetry of information between two agents. Their relationship with information is, in general, not monotonic. We provide sufficient conditions under which the monotonicity is guaranteed. Furthermore, by parameterizing information structures smoothly, we conduct comparative static analysis to explore the elationship between marginal values of information and ownership.
