演講者簡介 : 郭建廷教授為Ph.D. in Economics，University of California at Los Angeles (1993)。
現為Associate Professor，University of California at Riverside。
其主要研究領域為Macroeconomics。
演講摘要 : This paper examines the optimal (first-best) tax policy in a stochastic representative agent model that exhibits a "keeping up with the Joneses" utility function and imperfectly competitive product markets. We show that the optimal labor tax is a constant, whose sign is determined by the relative strength of consumption externality and monopoly p er. Moreover, the optimal capital tax is unambiguously negative and affects the economy counter cyclically. Hence, models with capital accumulation,
imperfect competition, and "keeping up with the Joneses" preferences call for traditional Keynesian demand management policies that are designed to mitigate business cycle fluctuations.
