Legislative Bargaining with Incomplete Information
2002/02/19
研討會日期 : 2002-02-19
時間 : 14:00
主講人 : 蔡崇聖
地點 : B棟110室
演講者簡介 : 蔡崇聖先生為Ph.D. in Economics， University of Wisconsin-Madison (expected 2002)。現正申請本所研究職務中
其主要研究領域為Public Economics、Microeconomics 及Political Economy。
演講摘要 : It is often asserted that uncertainty can explain oversized coalitions. To investigate whether this is the case in a dynamic setup, I study a legislative bargaining model to include incomplete information about time preferences. Signaling and reputation effects on formation of oversized coalitions are discussed. Since a relatively patient player demands more for the future in order to signal herself, the other players tend to exclude her at present because it requires more to buy her vote. Therefore, a relatively patient player has no incentives to reveal private information. It is shown in this paper that there exists no fully separating equilibrium when the type space of each player is continuous. On the other hand, oversized coalitions can make sense only when they fail with some probability. Hence, only a relatively patient player has incentives to form oversized coalitions, since it may put her in a better future position when the proposal fails to pass.
