【Metrics/Empirical Seminar】Are Public School Teachers Overpaid? Regression Discontinuity Evidence from a Ranked Waitlist in Kenya
2026/10/27
研討會日期 : 2026-10-27
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Tessa Bold
地點 : Conference Room B110
主持人 : Professor Bei Qin
演講者簡介 : Dr. Tessa Bold received her Ph.D. in Economics from Oxford University. She is currently a Professor of Development Economics at Stockholm University. Her research interests lie within Development Economics.
演講摘要 : Public employees in many developing economies earn significant wage premiums relative to informal, private sector workers (as high as 100% in East Africa and 500% in South Asia). To understand this phenomenon, we study the Kenyan government’s recruitment of 18,000 new teachers in 2010 through a ranked waitlist. We show standard fuzzy RD estimates overestimate the causal wage premium, as employment offers were made until a fixed number of applicants accepted jobs in each district, rendering the cutoffs endogenous. Correcting for this bias reduces the civil service wage premium to approximately 50%. This remaining gap is not attributable to observed or unobserved human capital, and data on motivation, effort, and working conditions appear inconsistent with efficiency wages or compensating differentials. Instead, we interpret these results through the lens of a classic dual labor market model with exogenous public sector wages. As the theory predicts, observational Mincerian regressions show teachers who fail to land a civil service job earn considerably less than non-teachers with similar observable human capital. This suggests the causal wage gap we estimate among teachers reflects a combination of high wages in the public sector and equilibrium effects driving down private sector teaching wages relative to other occupations.