【Micro Seminar】Punishment Architecture: How to Discipline Defections in Repeated Interactions
2026/11/04
研討會日期 : 2026-11-04
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Jaeok Park
地點 : Conference Room B110
主持人 : Professor Kong-Pin Chen
演講者簡介 : Dr. Jaeok Park received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of California, Los Angeles, in 2009. He is currently a Professor of Economics at Yonsei University. His research interests are Game Theory, Repeated Games, and Market Design.
演講摘要 : We study how time preference affects cooperation in repeated interactions when players have access to a richer punishment structure than in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. We conduct laboratory experiments using a stage game with three actions—cooperate (C), defect (D), and punish (P)—where P can impose a harsher punishment than D. We vary patience, present bias, and the availability of P across experimental environments and examine punishment behavior and its effects on cooperation. We find that participants generally favor D over P when responding to a unilateral defection. However, they use or plan to use P more frequently in environments with lower patience where perpetual defection is insufficient to sustain cooperation. Moreover, the use of P increases the likelihood of subsequent cooperation. These findings show that the effect of time preference on cooperation depends on the punishment architecture. In particular, unlike in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, lower patience and greater present bias need not reduce cooperation when players have access to punishment strategies harsher than perpetual defection.
