【Micro Seminar】Equilibrium Information Acquisition in Optimal Auctions
2026/11/03
研討會日期 : 2026-11-03
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Jeffrey Ely
地點 : Conference Room C103
主持人 : Professor Gunhaeng Lee
演講者簡介 : Dr. Jeffrey Ely received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of California, Berkeley in 1996. He is currently a Professor of Economics at Northwestern University. Her research interests are Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Behavioral Economics, and Evolution.
演講摘要 : We study non-cooperative information acquisition by bidders who will compete in an optimally-designed auction. The bidders simultaneously choose experiments privately revealing information about their respective willingnesses to pay. The auctioneer, knowing the experiments but not the realizations, designs an optimal auction against the resulting information structure. Bidders' best-responses are Myerson-regular: they require no ironing. In the symmetric equilibrium we characterize, each bidder adopts an information structure that satisfies a somewhat stronger regularity property. Among symmetric profiles with this property we show that it is the unique equilibrium.
