【Micro Seminar】The Revelation Principle on Information Networks
2026/07/08
研討會日期 : 2026-07-08
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Xiao Luo (羅曉)
地點 : Conference Room B110
主持人 : Professor Kong-Pin Chen
演講者簡介 : Dr. Xiao Luo received his Ph.D. in Economics from McGill University in 2000. He is currently an Associate Professor of Economics at the National University of Singapore. His research interests are Game Theory, Economic Theory, and Information Economics.
演講摘要 : Communication is central to social and economic organizations. We study the fundamental revelation principle on information networks, modeled as directed graphs in which agents have access to the information held by their neighbors. We show that the revelation principle may fail in the presence of such networks. We then provide a complete characterization of when the revelation principle holds in Myerson's (1982) general framework with network structure: any equilibrium of any Bayesian communication game with an information network can be represented by an incentive-compatible direct-revelation mechanism if and only if the network is transitive. This characterization gives rise to a well-defined notion of communication equilibrium for transitive networks: the set of such communication equilibria forms a convex polyhedron and contains all Bayes–Nash equilibria of the underlying game. Our approach is applicable to a broad range of revelation principles studied in the mechanism design and information design literature.
