【Micro Seminar】An Experiment on Threshold Public Goods Game with Communication under Unanimity Rule
2026/06/04
研討會日期 : 2026-06-04
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Po-Hsuan Lin
地點 : Conference Room B110
主持人 : Professor Yi-Hsuan Lin
演講者簡介 : Dr. Po-Hsuan Lin received his Ph.D. in Social Science from the California Institute of Technology in 2024. He is currently an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Virginia. His research interests are Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Behavioral Economics, and Experimental Economics.
演講摘要 : This paper theoretically and experimentally studies a threshold public goods game with communication, in which each player decides whether to contribute based on a private cost and can send a non-binding binary message before making their contribution decision. The public good is provided only if all players contribute. We find theoretically that cursedness---the tendency to neglect other players' private information and actions---can reduce the informativeness of messages and, consequently, public good provision. Moreover, the effect of cursedness is sensitive to group size and to the support of the distribution of private costs. We experimentally manipulate group size (two or three players) and the support of the distribution of private costs, and find that the disequilibrium behavior is qualitatively consistent with the predictions of cursedness. However, public goods provision remains at the efficient level because the emergence of altruistic behavior offsets the inefficiency caused by cursedness.
