演講者簡介 : Dr. John K.-H. Quah received his Ph.D. in Mathematics from the University of California, Berkeley in 1994. He is currently a Distinguished Professor of Economics at the National University of Singapore. His research interests are Monotone Comparative Statics, Revealed Preference Analysis, Demand Aggregation, and General Equilibrium Theory.
演講摘要 : It is well-known that in a setting where voters have single peaked preferences over alternatives defined on a one-dimensional space, the median voter's preference is decisive. However, in many plausible environments, voters decide among alternatives with multi-dimensional characteristics. We generalize the notion of a median voter to such multi-dimensional settings and show that under a natural multi-stage voting protocol, the median voter's preferred alternative is also the eventual outcome of the vote. Furthermore, this outcome is robust to whether agents vote naively, strategically, or switch between these decision rules.
