演講者 : Dr. Ritesh Jain received his Ph.D. from the Ohio State University in 2018. He is currently a Lecturer at the University of Liverpool. His research interests are Microeconomic Theory, Mechanism Design, Mathematical Economics, Implementation Theory, Behavioral Economics, and Experimental Economics.
演講摘要 : A social choice function (SCF) is robustly implementable if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. A stronger variant of the interim condition introduced by Oury and Tercieux (2012), termed strong Interim Rationalizable Monotonicity (s-IRM), fully identifies the class of SCFs that are robustly implementable. Its proof is constructive and based on the iterative deletion procedure associated with rationalizability, as developed by Jain and Lombardi (2022). Finally, s-IRM is equivalent to the condition of robust monotonicity proposed by Bergemann and Morris (2011).
