演講者簡介 : Dr. Junrok Park received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of California, Los Angeles in 2022. He is currently an Assistant Professor of Economics at National Taiwan University. His research interests are Economic Theory, Mechanism Design, and Information Design.
演講摘要 : We study partnership dissolution under dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, ex post individual rationality, and ex ante no-deficit. Because initial ownership makes outside options type-dependent, agents face countervailing incentives—they may prefer to buy in some states and to sell in others—so no type is uniformly worst off. We formulate the design problem as a saddle-point problem in which the allocation rule and each agent's endogenous worst-off type mapping are jointly determined. With two agents, the optimal mechanism exhibits a three-region structure: one agent buys, the other buys, and an intermediate exclusion region in which no trade occurs. The exclusion region emerges endogenously from the interaction of dominant-strategy truthfulness, ex post participation, and budget balance. For any initial ownership share profile, the exclusion region is non-empty. Thus, the analysis shows that strengthening the solution concept from Bayesian/interim to dominant-strategy/ex post qualitatively changes the form of the optimal dissolution mechanism.
