【Brownbag】Causality and Causal Misperception in Dynamic Games
2026/05/08
研討會日期 : 2026-05-08
時間 : 12:10
主講人 : Professor Sungmin Park (朴聖民)
地點 : Conference Room B110
演講者簡介 : Dr. Sungmin Park received his Ph.D. in Economics from the Ohio State University in 2025. He is currently an Assistant Professor at National Taiwan University. His research interests are Microeconomic Theory, Labor Economics, and Financial Economics.
演講摘要 : I develop a game-theoretic solution concept in which agents have misperceptions about causality. In an observation-consistent equilibrium (OE), each player best responds to a belief about Nature or other players' actions consistent with observed outcomes. A maximum-entropy observation-consistent equilibrium (MOE) is an OE in which each player's belief maximizes the Shannon entropy among all observation-consistent beliefs. Every finite extensive-form game with perfect recall has a MOE. The equilibrium captures common causal misperceptions of correlation neglect, omitted-variable bias, and simultaneity bias. When players observe outcomes perfectly, OE and MOE are equivalent to self-confirming equilibrium and perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
