演講者簡介 : Dr. Andrew B. Choi received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Chicago in 2023. He is currently a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Michigan. His research interests are Economic Theory, Mechanism Design, and Information Design.
演講摘要 : A principal chooses a policy at a future date, and wishes to match the policy to an uncertain state. An agent chooses when to make an irreversible investment, and wishes to invest only if he expects the policy will be favorable. Information about the state is publicly and gradually revealed over time. Moral hazard arises because the agent wishes to wait for more information. To incentivize the agent to invest early, it is optimal for the principal to provide certainty about her future policy. This is inefficient -- the agent's benefit from certainty is always outweighed by the principal's cost from reduced policy flexibility. The agent receives rent only if policy and early investment are complements. We provide conditions for moral hazard to delay investment. Our results apply to environmental subsidies and procurement of vaccines.
