【Micro Seminar】Incentive-compatible Information Design
2025/12/08
研討會日期 : 2025-12-08
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Jeffrey Ely
地點 : Conference Room B110
主持人 : Professor Gunhaeng Lee
演講者簡介 : Professor Jeffrey Ely received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of California, Berkeley in 1996. He is currently a Charles E. and Emma Morrison Professor at Northwestern University. His research interests are Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Behavioral Economics, and Evolution.
演講摘要 : We study the design of mechanisms by an intermediary that generates information for a sender to persuade a receiver about an unknown attribute of the sender. The sender is initially privately, but imperfectly informed about her attribute, and the receiver takes an action based on posterior beliefs about the sender's attribute and the sender's belief about the attribute. The design of the mechanism, therefore, confronts both incentive-compatibility constraints (for the sender) and obedience constraints (for the receiver). We characterize profit-maximizing mechanisms when the intermediary contracts with the sender, and we specialize to two applications: the design of college-admissions tests and the optimal use of consumer data on a digital market platform.
