【AEW Webinar】Innovation Networks and R&D Allocation

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• 研討會日期 : 2025-07-17
• 時間 : 15:00
• 主講人 : Professor Ernest Liu
• 地點 : Register and join online
• 演講者簡介 : Professor Ernest Liu received his Ph.D. in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2017. He is currently an Associate Professor of Economics at Princeton University. His research interests are Networks, Growth Grade, Finance, and Macro-development.
• 演講摘要 : We study the cross-sector allocation of R&D resources in an innovation network, where one sector's past innovations may benefit other sectors' future innovations. We solve for the optimal R&D allocation and show that a planner valuing long-term growth should allocate more R&D toward network-central sectors, but this incentive is muted for countries receiving more foreign knowledge spillovers. We derive sufficient statistics for measuring the welfare impact of improving cross-sector R&D allocation. Empirically, we build the global innovation network based on patent citations and evaluate R&D allocative efficiency across countries. For the US, improving R&D allocation could generate 8% welfare gains.
• Working Paper Title : Discrimination and Pre-game Communication: An Experimental Investigation
• Working Paper Speaker : Mr. Ding-Wei Wang
• Working Paper Speaker Biography : Mr. Ding-Wei Wang received his B.A. and M.A. in Economics from National Taiwan University, and is set to attend U-Michigan's School of Information in Fall 2025. His interests are Behavioral Game Theory and Experimental Economics.
• Working Paper Abstract : We conduct a Stag Hunt hiring experiment where workers decide on firm-specific investments and firms decide whether to hire the worker. In the Legacy Stage and Baseline Stage, we follow Dianat et al. (2022) to induce statistical discrimination across workers, who can be GREEN (advantaged) or PURPLE (disadvantaged). Subsequently, in the Policy Stage, we evaluate the efficacy of three policy interventions: removing firm access to worker types ("Pure Colorblind"), additionally allowing workers to voluntarily disclose ("Self-Disclosure") or further allowing workers to send a costly signal indicating their intention to invest ("Intention Signaling (with Self-Disclosure)"). We find equalization occurs under pure colorblind at the expense of advantaged workers, but is undone by their voluntary type disclosure. Intention Signaling induces coordination on the investing-hiring equilibrium and is utilized mostly by disadvantaged workers. These findings highlight the potential drawbacks of colorblind policies and point to costly signaling as a less problematic alternative.