【Micro Seminar】Sequential Mechanisms for Evidence Acquisition
2025/09/11
Date : 2025-09-11
Time : 14:30
Speaker : Professor Barton Lipman
Venue : Conference Room B110
Presider : Professor Yi-Hsuan Lin
Background : Professor Barton Lipman received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Michigan in 1985. He is currently a Professor at Boston University. His research interests are Decision Theory and Economic Theory.
Abstract : We consider optimal mechanisms for inducing agents to acquire costly evidence in a setting where a principal has a good to allocate that all agents want. We show that optimal mechanisms are necessarily sequential in nature and have a threshold structure. Agents with higher costs of obtaining evidence and/or worse distributions of value for the principal are asked for evidence later, if at all. We derive these results in part by exploiting the relationship between the Lagrangian for this problem and the classic Weitzman (1979) "Pandora's box" problem.