【Job Talk】Stable Matchings under Two-sided Asymmetric Incomplete Information
2025/01/15
研討會日期 : 2025-01-15
時間 : 10:30
主講人 : Mr. Changwoo Park
地點 : Conference Room B110
主持人 : Professor Yi-Hsuan Lin
演講者簡介 : Mr. Park is expected to receive his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Rochester in 2025. His research fields are Microeconomic Theory, Market Design, and Game Theory. He is applying for a position of the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica now.
演講摘要 : We introduce and study worker-firm matching where incomplete information is present on both sides but is "asymmetric": workers are partially informed of the characteristics of each firm, while firms have no information about the characteristics of each particular worker. We propose a notion of stability and explore its welfare and structural properties. We ask whether and when the stable outcomes are assortative and, thus, are "ex-post efficient". Unfortunately, even with just one worker who is uncertain of two adjacent firm types, some stable outcomes may not be assortative. This disappointing result prompts us to ask to what extent the stable outcomes are assortative and how varying levels of information available to workers affect the extent of their partial assortativity. We introduce two notions of partial assortativity, "nonwastefulness" and a "parametrized variant of assortativity", and for each, we identify a condition on information structures under which the stable outcomes satisfy the respective notion. The intuition gained from this analysis also helps identify conditions that ensure the full assortativity of, and hence, the ex-post efficiency of stable outcomes. Next, we turn to the question of how stable outcomes arise. We show that starting from an arbitrary outcome, the process of randomly selecting blocking pairs and matching them converges to a stable outcome with probability one.
