【Renewed Employment Talk】Robust Equilibrium Selection with Cost Sensitive Mutation
2024/12/03
研討會日期 : 2024-12-03
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Wei-Torng Juang (莊委桐)
地點 : Conference Room B110
主持人 : Professor Yi-Hsuan Lin
演講者簡介 : Professor Wei-Torng Juang received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Cambridge in 1998. He is an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica. His research interests are Microeconomics and Mathematical Economics.
演講摘要 : We study equilibrium selection under state-dependent mutation in which agents are less likely to mutate to a rule that involves higher deviation cost. By making three mild assumptions we show that selection among multiple equilibria is feasible and if some subset of rules is available, then the selection is guaranteed. The above subset of rules has some “nice” properties: Each rule in the set (i) plays best response at steady states, (ii) can be “triggered” to play some particular equilibrium and, (iii) always plays the corresponding equilibrium action at any equilibrium state. Adopting the stochastic stability approach, we show that the equilibrium that involves “the highest deviation cost” is stochastically stable. The definition of the highest deviation cost is open in our results. It may be payoff difference between playing the deviation action and playing the equilibrium action, or the ratio of the payoff difference depicted above over the equilibrium payoff, or any other possible measure of “deviation cost.” In other words, our results accommodate a broader range of equilibrium selection results: Once we specify a definition of deviation cost, a corresponding equilibrium will come out as stochastically stable.
