【Micro Seminar】Optimal Feedback Dynamics Against Free-Riding in Collective Experimentation
2024/10/29
研討會日期 : 2024-10-29
時間 : 14:30
主講人 : Professor Hülya K. K. Eraslan
地點 : Conference Room B110
主持人 : Professor Gunhaeng Lee
演講者簡介 : Professor Hülya K. K. Eraslan received her Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Minnesota in 2001. She is the Ralph O’Connor Professor of Economics at Rice University. Her research interests are Political Economy, Game Theory, and Corporate Finance.
演講摘要 : We consider a dynamic model in which a principal decides what information to release about a product of unknown quality (e.g., a vaccine) to incentivize agents to experiment with the product. Assuming that the agents are long-lived and forward-looking, their incentive to wait and see other agents’ experiences poses a significant obstacle to social learning. We show that the optimal feedback mechanism to mitigate information freeriding takes a strikingly simple form: the principal recommends adoption as long as she observes no bad news, but only with some probability; once she does not recommend at some point, she stays silent forever after that. Our analysis suggests the optimality of premature termination, which in turn implies that: (i) false positives (termination in the good state) are more acceptable than false negatives (continuation in the bad state); (ii) overly cautious mechanisms that are biased toward termination can be welfare-enhancing.