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【Micro Seminar】Robust Implementation in Rationalizable Strategies in General Mechanisms


  • 研討會日期 : 2024-10-08
  • 時間 : 14:30
  • 主講人 : Professor Takashi Kunimoto
  • 地點 : Conference Room B110
  • 主持人 : Professor Chih-Chun Yang
  • 演講者簡介 : Professor Takashi Kunimoto received his PhD from Brown University in 2005. He is currently a Professor at the Singapore Management University. His research fields of interest are Bargaining, Contract Theory, Game Theory, Implementation Theory, Mechanism Design, and Microeconomic Theory.
  • 演講摘要 : A social choice function (SCF) is robustly implementable in rationalizable strategies (RoRat-implementable) if every (interim correlated) rationalizable outcome on every type space agrees with the SCF. We establish that RoRat-implementation is equivalent to weak rationalizable implementation, an implementation notion based on belief-free rationalizability. Applying this equivalence, we identify weak robust monotonicity (weak RM) as the characterizing condition for RoRat-implementation. We show that weak RM is equivalent to semi-strict ex post incentive compatibility and the preference-reversal condition. Furthermore, we clarify the relationships between different “robust” and “rationalizable” implementation notions discussed in the literature. In particular, we prove that strict robust monotonicity (strict RM) characterizes robust implementation in interim equilibria (RoEq-implementation), closing a gap in the literature. We present an example in which weak RM is strictly weaker than strict RM. Thus, RoRat-implementation may be more permissive than RoEq-implementation. We apply our results to quasilinear environments and provide a comprehensive discussion on additional implications of RoRat-implementation.