演講者簡介 : Professor Jawwad Noor received his PhD from the University of Rochester in 2005. He is an Associate Professor at Boston University. His research fields are Economic Theory, Decision Theory, Psychology and Economics, and Experimental Economics.
演講摘要 : Will a rational deceiver operating in a noisy environment leave a trace of its deception? We study a dynamic predator-prey game where a prey decides whether or not to hide in its burrow. If the state is safe then the noise in the environment is i.i.d., but if the state is dangerous, then some of that noise is optimally made by a predator. By making noise, the predator gets closer to the prey and enhances the probability of capturing it when it attacks, but its noise strategy also determines the prey’s beliefs. We study the equilibrium noise strategy of the predator: a perfectly patient predator perfectly mimics the safe environment, whereas an impatient predator’s noise will not be i.i.d and will exhibit a higher chance of streaks of noise. Under natural assumptions, the probability of noise is higher closer to the attack.
