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【Job talk】Performance scores and Strategic Choices of Kidney Transplant Centers


  • 研討會日期 : 2024-01-15
  • 時間 : 10:45
  • 主講人 : Mr. Han Ng
  • 地點 : Conference Room B110
  • 主持人 : Professor Tzu-Ting Yang
  • 演講者簡介 : Mr. Ng is expected to receive his Ph.D. in Economics from Pennsylvania State University in 2024. His research fields are Applied Microeconomics, Health Economics, and Industrial Organization. He is applying for a position of the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica now.
  • : Medicare introduced the Conditions of Participation (CoP) in 2007. This policy examines a transplant center’s performance every six months. If the observed-expected (OE) 1-year death ratio exceeds 1.5, Medicare flags the center for poor performance and threatens decertification. I analyze the effect of this policy using a difference-in-differences design. The key assumption is that centers with a low observed-expected (OE) 1-year death ratio are unaffected by CoP’s introduction. I show that transplant centers monitor their OE ratio and respond to the threat of punishment by declining transplants even before they approach the CoP threshold, 1.5. This rejection pattern occurs more often for medium and highrisk transplants and low-volume transplant centers. Secondly, I found no evidence that CoP reduced the post-transplant death rate across low/medium/high-risk transplants. My results suggest that strategic behavior among transplant centers is more widespread than previously thought.