演講者簡介 : Professor Olivier Jeanne received his Ph.D. from École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in 1996. He is currently a Professor at John Hopkins University. His research interests are International Macroeconomics and Monetary Policy.
演講摘要 : There are many historical examples of governments reducing their debts and avoiding default through financial repression. This paper presents a theory of optimal financial repression in a model of government debt and default. Financial repression can prevent a default when a desirable fiscal adjustment is prevented by fiscal deadlock, but should preserve the incentives to implement fiscal adjustments. A calibrated version of the model shows that optimal financial repression yields substantial welfare gains. Financial repression is a policy of last resort that should be rarely used in equilibrium, but ruling out financial repression entirely leads to an equilibrium with frequent defaults. The fiscal incentives are more difficult to preserve in a monetary union than in countries that have their own currency.
