演講者簡介 : Professor Itai Arieli received his PhD in Mathematics from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Center for the Study of Rationality in 2010. He is currently an Associate Professor at Technion – Israel Institute of Technology. His research spans aspects of game theory, including equilibrium theory, learning in games, evolutionary game theory, and Bayesian learning in social networks.
演講摘要 : We study the robustness of cheap-talk equilibria to infinitesimal private information of the receiver in a model with a binary state-space and state-independent sender-preferences. We show that the sender-optimal equilibrium is robust if and only if this equilibrium either reveals no information to the receiver or fully reveals one of the states with positive probability. We then characterize the actions that can be played with positive probability in any robust equilibrium. Finally, we fully characterize the optimal sender-utility under binary receiver's private information, and provide bounds for the optimal sender-utility under general private information.
