【Job talk】Screening without Single Crossing

  • 研討會日期 : 2023-01-31
  • 時間 : 10:00
  • 主講人 : Mr. Changhyun Kwak
  • 地點 : Online or Conference Room B110
  • 主持人 : Professor Wei-Torng Juang
  • 演講者簡介 : Mr. Kwak is expected to receive his Ph.D. in Economics from Yale University in 2023. His research interest are Microeconomics, Mechanism Design, and Game Theory. He is applying for a position of the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica now.
  • 演講摘要 : This paper provides a sufficient condition under which a general screening problem can be reduced, without the principal’s payoff loss, to one with the single crossing property. The sufficient condition requires the agent’s types to be ordered in a way that two marginal rates of substitution are both increasing in the type order. The monotonicity of one marginal rate of substitution allows the optimal mechanism to use only an allocation subset. The monotonicity of the other marginal rate of substitution ensures that the agent’s preferences over the allocation subset satisfy the single crossing property. I apply the result to various economic problems with multi-dimensional allocations: multi-product monopoly, product line design, Bayesian persuasion, and delegation.