演講者簡介 : Mr. Choi is expected to receive his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Chicago in 2023. His research interest is Microeconomic Theory, including mechanism design, information design, and matching. He is applying for a position of the Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica now.
演講摘要 : A principal gradually receives private signals about his payoffs before deciding whether to retain or fire an agent and wants the agent to stay until he decides. The agent values being retained but faces a decreasing outside option and would rather leave if she does not expect to be retained. The principal optimally induces the agent to stay by committing to make a promise, that is, by committing to make an early decision and communicate this decision to the agent. The principal’s truth-telling incentives introduce distortions. If the agent’s initial outside option is high, she stays too often and is retained too often relative to the efficient benchmark. Regardless of his signals—even if he knows he will prefer to fire her—the principal sometimes promises to retain the agent. The principal may ask the agent to stay until he fully learns his payoffs, only to fire her; this does not necessarily mean that the principal leads the agent on. We apply our results to worker retention, holdup, and forward guidance.
